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Lawyers, Mediation, and the Management of
Divorce Practice

Lynn Mather

Craig A. McEwen
Richard J. Maiman

Despite a widespread assumption that divorce mediation and divorce lawyers
are incompatible, lawyers do play active-if largely unexamined-roles in many
mediation programs. This article reports on the work of lawyers in a state with
mandatory mediation. We find that lawyers in Maine have generally embraced
mediation because it helps them manage problems inherent in divorce practice. Mandated divorce mediation facilitates both settlement negotiation and
trial preparation, permits client participation in decisionmaking without requiring lawyers to surrender control, provides a forum for resolving both legal
and nonlegal issues, and promotes efficient case management.

Discussions of legal practice and dispute resolution are
often dominated-and distorted-by the tendency to view the
world in either-or terms (Nader 1984). Both the popular and academic literatures are preoccupied with contrasts between formal
and informal processes, competitive and cooperative attorney
styles, clients' rights and needs, lawyer and client control of decisionmaking, and so on. Whatever utility it may have for framing
rhetorical questions about legal reform, such binary thinking
does not accord with the more complex realities of legal practice,
which are often located not at one end or another of such polarities but in the dynamic interplay between them.
The experiences and observations of divorce attorneys who
participate in mediation with their clients provide a new angle of
vision on some of these central realities of day-to-day law practice. They also offer fresh perspectives on the highly variable
character of divorce mediation itself. In this article, we examine
how lawyers in the state of Maine report understanding and parThis research has been supported by grants SES-8910625, SES-8910649, and SES8911653 from the Law and Social Sciences Division of the National Science Foundation.
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ticipating in mandatory, court-sponsored divorce mediation.
From the lawyers' descriptions of their work, we identify four
central challenges of divorce practice. Although experienced attorneys may give them little conscious thought, these dimensions
of practice require numerous and sometimes difficult decisions
that lie at the heart of divorce lawyers' work: how to pursue both
negotiation and trial preparation; how to encourage client participation in case preparation while retaining one's professional authority; how to provide clients with legal advice while addressing
vitally important nonlegal issues; and how to structure and manage cases so that they can be moved predictably and expeditiously.
While viewing the practice of divorce law as organized
around the decisions necessary to solve these problems, we also
see-through the eyes of participating lawyers-a mediation process that is far more varied and complex than the simple models
of many of its advocates and critics. This mediation, for example,
permits talk about rights as well as problem-solving negotiation;
encourages client involvement while providing opportunity to
lawyers to advocate for and support clients; and structures negotiation at least as often as it substitutes for trial. Indeed, we believe
that the wide acceptance of mediation by divorce lawyers in
Maine can be understood in terms of its apparent capacity to expand the options and ease the choices for lawyers in dealing with
the demands of their divorce practices.
These issues until now have been largely unexplored. Research about the day-to-day work of lawyers is limited (Abel 1985)
and focuses largely on the tasks they perform rather than on the
decisions that underlie those tasks. Research on lawyer-client interaction has yielded richer insights, particularly in emphasizing
its nuanced and fluid character (Felstiner & Sarat 1992). Studies
of divorce lawyers thus far have left their experience with mediation unexamined, even though much of that literature highlights
attorneys' strong settlement orientation (see, e.g., O'Gorman
1963; Kressel 1985; Sarat & Felstiner 1986, 1988; Griffiths 1986;
Erlanger, Chambliss, & Melli 1987; Ingleby 1991, 1992; Davis
1988). Finally, lawyers appear as little more than shadows in the
literature on divorce mediation,1 where research has focused
largely on divorcing parties (Pearson & Thoennes 1985, 1989) or
on the mediation process (Greatbatch & Dingwall 1989). Consequently, we know almost nothing about the roles that lawyers
play in mediation and in advising their clients about it.
I Davis (1988) is a notable exception. In the commentary, both critics and champions of mediation assume that lawyers are largely absent from the divorce process (Rosenberg 1991; Hyman 1987; see also Riskin 1982). Many mediation opponents likewise assume-but deplore-the absence of lawyers, since without their advice divorcing parties,
particularly women, are pressured in mediation to negotiate away their legal entitlements
(Bryan 1992; Fineman 1991; Grillo 1991). The virtual absence of attorneys in discussions
of divorce mediation rests on the assumption that there is a fundamental incompatibility
between the mediation process and the work of lawyers.
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This article begins to examine these issues with data collected
from interviews with Maine divorce lawyers. In the sections that
follow we describe our research methods; situate our analysis in a
description of mediation in Maine; explore in detail the four
dimensions of practice and the ways mediation assists lawyer in
dealing with them; and reflect on the impact of mediation on
divorce practice and the characteristics of mediation that produce that impact.
I. Data and Methods
This examination of the integration of divorce mediation
into divorce law practice draws from data gathered in a larger
study of the day-to-day work of divorce attorneys in Maine and
New Hampshire. Here we focus on data from Maine, although
occasional comparisons are made with New Hampshire divorce
cases and lawyers. Our data come primarily from lengthy semistructured interviews with 163 divorce lawyers, conducted by the
authors in 1990-91. To select lawyers to interview, we sampled
the 1989 divorce dockets of courts in three New Hampshire and
four Maine counties that were roughly similar with regard to
population size, urban concentration, and income. 2 In each
court3 we recorded the names of the lawyers of record, develop-

ing a frequency distribution of their appearances. Then we sampled the list, taking all the lawyers with the most frequent representations, about half of those with moderate frequencies, and a
few of those with lesser frequencies. In no case did we choose
from the many lawyers who represented only one or two divorce
clients a year. We supplemented this list of active divorce lawyers
with names identified by other attorneys and by court clerks.
Through this process we identified 178 divorce lawyers and
arranged and completed interviews with 92% of them. Our interviewees included 88 lawyers in Maine and 75 in New Hampshire.4
Of the total interviewed, 37% were female and 63% were male.
Most of the lawyers worked as solo practitioners or in small law firms.
Our interviews averaged 90 minutes each and were taped and
later transcribed. Only one part of the interview focused on the
relationship between mediation and divorce practice. We asked
questions about the nature and frequency of lawyers' participa2 Initially we selected three counties in each state, but we later added one court in a

fourth Maine county that bordered on New Hampshire in an effort to include divorce
lawyers who practiced in both states.

3 Although the counties are comparable demographically across the two states, the
court systems are not. In Maine each county has a superior court and one or more district
courts in which divorce cases are filed. In New Hampshire the superior court for each
county hears a/ divorce cases. As a result, we ended up with three courts in New Hampshire and seven in Maine.
4 For discussion of gender-based differences and similarities among these divorce
lawyers, see Maiman, Mather, & McEwen 1992.
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tion in mediation, the advantages and disadvantages of mediation in divorce cases, and the lawyers' perceptions of mediation
in Maine.
In addition to the interviews, we gathered data from the
docket records of a large sample of divorce cases from the same
counties in Maine and New Hampshire. We systematically sampled divorce dockets in each court during several years in the
period 1979-88, coding information about number and types of
motions filed, court hearings and judicial orders, dates of filing
and disposition, and lawyers' names. 5 A total of 4,790 Maine divorce cases and 2,001 New Hampshire cases were thus coded.
Since the argument presented in this article rests primarily
on our interview data, it is important to address their strengths
and weaknesses. We view the interviews in two different ways. At
one level, the lawyers interviewed were respondents whose answers can be analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively for
patterns and frequencies. We recognize, however, that the lawyers' reports of their behavior may not reflect their actual practices. Hence, wherever possible, we have used other sources of
data for corroboration. The interviews can also be understood at
another level, however. That is, the attorneys are informants
about their own work and that of their colleagues. These women
and men have typically handled hundreds of divorce cases over
years and are thoughtful and critical-as well as self-interestedobservers of the world in which they work (Sch6n 1983). As respondents, the attorneys are reporting their understandings, perceptions, and beliefs about mediation and the divorce process.
As informants, they offer insights and observations that help to
illuminate our understanding of a divorce lawyer's work and the
place of mediation in it.
The specific form that divorce mediation takes influences significantly the response of attorneys to it. Thus, in the next section, we situate Maine's divorce mediation program within the
national context of mediation alternatives. We also describe basic
features of the Maine law and compare mediated and nonmediated divorce cases in Maine, particularly in terms of the role
of lawyers.
H. Divorce Mediation in Maine
Divorce mediation differs widely across the United States,
and thus statements about "divorce mediation" in general should
be suspect. As examples of this variation, consider that in some
5 In Maine we coded cases from 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, and 1988, while
in New Hampshire we sampled cases only from 1980, 1984, and 1988. We drew samples
from more years in Maine in order to cover the time period immediately surrounding the
adoption of mandated mediation, and its temporary suspension in early 1986. Depending
on the size of the court, we sampled one-fourth (large courts), one-third (medium-sized
courts), or one-half (small courts) of the divorce docket.
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areas mediation is purely voluntary, while in others it is mandated by the state or by the local court;6 mediation may address
all issues of a divorce or be limited by law to child custody and
visitation; 7 and either public or private mediators can deliver mediation services. Some mediation programs exclude the parties'
lawyers, while others encourage them to participate. 8 Mediators
themselves vary in their backgrounds, credentials, and training,
so that some mediators see their roles largely as nondirective and
facilitative, while others seek to be more active and judgmental.
These and other critical variations in divorce mediation result
from official state policies, and from program ideologies and
training (Rogers & McEwen 1989). Moreover, mediation practices vary significantly even in mediation programs that share
some of the same features. California, for example, 'permits
county-by-county choice on such issues as lawyer presence,
whether fees are to be charged for mediation, and whether
to advise judges about how to decide
mediators may be required
9
cases that do not settle.
Given this diversity in mediation policy and practice, our
analysis of divorce mediation must be carefully contextualized.
We are reporting on mediation in Maine, a state that has organized divorce mediation differently from many states. In July 1984,
divorce mediation became mandatory in Maine prior to the
scheduling of any contested hearing in all cases involving minor
children (Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, title 19, § 752). Un6 The National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, VA, maintains a State ADR
Program Database that is based on responses to standardized forms by directors of about
1,100 U.S. court-annexed and court-referred dispute resolution programs. The Database
is referred to hereinafter as "NCSC Database." The data from this database were supplied
to us in fall 1981 by Kenneth Pankey of the NCSC, but all the summaries of the data are
our own.

The NCSC Database indicates that of the 205 court-related divorce mediation programs for which it has data, 75 mandated participation categorically, 75 permitted caseby-case judicial (mandatory) referrals, and the remaining 55 were initiated by one or both
parties.
7 The NCSC Database indicates that of the 205 court-related divorce mediation programs for which it has data, 109 focused exclusively on custody or visitation conflicts,
while the other 96 included spousal support and or property division issues as well.
8 Even where prohibited from participation in custody mediation, lawyers are still
likely to be engaged to deal with property matters and to advise clients regarding custody
issues. Attorneys may serve as gatekeepers to the mediation process, advise clients about
negotiation goals, and review potential agreements. In some mediation programs, however, lawyers play even more active and visible roles. According to information from the
NCSC Database, lawyers regularly participate in mediation sessions in 14% of the 205
court-related domestic relations programs included in the data set; an additional 4% of
programs report at least occasional lawyer participation in or observation of mediation
sessions.
9 California superior courts vary considerably in their choices. Of 54 courts reporting, 33 indicated that mediators made recommendations to judges in at least some cases;
14 courts reported charging for mandated mediation, while 41 did not (Judicial Council
of California 1990). Of the 34 California courts responding to the NCSC Database survey,
24 indicated that lawyers did not participate in mediation sessions, 5 indicated that they
did so actively, and 5 that their participation occurred by agreement of the parties.
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like most divorce mediation statutes, the Maine law allowed mediation to focus on all issues in divorce, not just on child custody
and visitation. Also, the mandate means in practice that if parties
with children have reached a settlement on their own or anticipate doing so, they need not schedule mediation. Only in those
cases where one or both parties want mediation or where one or
both anticipate the possibility of a contested hearing is a request
made-by the parties, not the court-to schedule mediation.
Generally, mediation in Maine is done by nonlawyer mediators
who have limited formal training and who work for very modest
wages from the state (Orbeton 1987). Divorce cases in Maine typically involve only one mediation session, held at the local courthouse, lasting on average between two and three hours.' 0
As a consequence of the 1984 mandate, the number of divorce mediation sessions increased precipitously, from 350 in
1983 (when mediation was voluntary and only available in parts
of the state) to 4,918 in 1985 (Maine Judicial Department 1987).
In 1985, the first full year of mandated mediation, close to 30%
of the total divorces filed in Maine went to mediation, compared
to about 4% in 1983.11 In 1986 the state assessed a fee of $60 per
couple for the mediation service (Orbeton 1987). Thereafter,
the percentage of divorces going to mediation declined to a rate
of about 22% by 1990.
Maine lawyers have, from the start, actively assisted their clients in making strategic decisions about whether to enter mediation. Lawyers' recommendations about mediation depend, of
course, on their having had prior involvement in the case. In
Maine, lawyers typically represent fewer than half of divorcing
parties, a figure that is consistent with other studies nationwide
(Yale Law Journal 1976; Goerdt 1992). In our sample of Maine
divorce cases from 1979 to 1988, neither party was represented in
16% of the cases, only the plaintiff was represented in another
44%, and the defendant only in less than 2%. Both parties had
12
legal representation in 38% of the cases.
10 The facts and characterizations reported here come from Maine Court Media-

tion Service 1982, 1988; and Orbeton 1987.
11 The percentages for 1983 and 1985 are estimates. Until 1986 the Court Mediation Service only kept track of the number of "domestic relations mediation sessions
held." Some cases involved more than one session, however, and not all domestic relations sessions focused directly on divorce; some dealt, for example, with postdivorce ac-

tions. Beginning in 1986, statistical reports included data both on numbers of sessions
and on numbers of cases. These reports further differentiated divorce mediations from
mediations on temporary orders or postdivorce matters. Proportions (cases/sessions; divorce/domestic relations) drawn from the more recent data were used to make estimates
for 1983 and 1985 (Maine Judicial Department 1987, 1990).
12 These percentages are weighted averages from the district court and the superior
court reflecting the proportions of divorce cases filed in each court. Lawyers are much
more likely to be present in superior court divorces (80.7% involved two lawyers), but less
than 8% of Maine divorces occur in these courts. Lawyers described a wide range of reasons for choosing one court over the other for their cases-including quality of judges
and scheduling.
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The typical mediation case in Maine, however, usually involved two attorneys. In our sample of mediated cases since 1984
(n=422), 80% involved two lawyers, and another 17% had one
lawyer, typically for the plaintiff. In only 3% of the cases did both
mediating parties proceed without any lawyer. Mediated cases
also had substantially more than the average level of legal contest. Analysis of our docket data shows that, on average, mediated
cases took twice as long to dispose of as nonmediated cases in the
same courts (355 days vs. 184 days); 13 had more than three times
as many temporary or discovery motions (1.82 motions per case
vs. 0.5) and court actions such as motion hearings and issuance
of temporary orders (.48 court actions per case vs. .14) .14 In stark
contrast to the assumption that mediation substitutes for an adversarial legal process, mediated cases in Maine since 1984 appear to have been more legally contested than nonmediated
cases and more likely to have two attorneys involved. Clearly, the
requirement in Maine that contested cases be mediated produced this result.
Not only were lawyers likely to represent parties in mediation,
but they also regularly attended mediation sessions. Of the
Maine lawyers we interviewed, 78% reported they "always" attended mediation sessions while another 17% "usually" attended. 15 The partial exception was one Maine county, where
only 48% of the respondents reported always attending mediation. However, there was general agreement among the lawyers
in that county that their local practice was moving toward attorney attendance, the norm for much of the rest of the state.
Maine divorce lawyers have not only accepted mandated mediation as a fact of life but have with a few exceptions embraced
it warmly. Of our Maine lawyers, 89% expressed unambiguous
support for mediation, while 8% reported finding it useful for
custody but not for financial issues, and 4% said they disliked
mediation. Eighty-five percent of lawyers indicated that they voluntarily sought mediation, at least occasionally, in cases where
there were no minor children. However, one-third of the lawyers
voiced concerns about the uneven quality of divorce mediators
or about the cost and time absorbed by mediation.
13 The greater length of mediated cases presumably was a function of the nature of
the cases in mediation-i.e., those with greater complexity and conflict. The mediation
proceeding itself may also have contributed to the length, similar to MacCoun's (1991)
finding that the introduction of mandatory arbitration in New Jersey led to a significant
increase in the filing-to-termination time in automobile negligence cases.
14 These figures are based on our sample of 422 mediated and 1,758 nonmediated
cases from 1985, 1986, and 1988. The length of each case was measured from the date of
filing to date of final disposition. The average number of motions per case was based on a
count of motions described below in note 36. The measure of court actions is the average
number per case of hearings on motions and issuance of temporary orders or orders for
protections from abuse.
15 The director of Maine's Court Mediation Service similarly reports high rates of
lawyer attendance and participation in divorce mediation sessions (Charbonneau 1993).
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We are left to question, then, how and why Maine divorce
lawyers have adapted to mediation so completely? The answer
lies, we believe, in the character of divorce law practice and the
capacity of mediation to assist lawyers in handling some of the
key challenges in their day-to-day work.

m. Adaptation: Incorporating Mediation into Divorce
Law Practice
The practices of divorce lawyers involve a range of different
tasks and problems, each requiring skill and sensitivity. At times
they may demand potentially inconsistent conduct such as sharing or not sharing information with the other party or making
professional judgments on behalf of clients or leaving decisions
open to clients. We believe that the willingness of Maine lawyers
to accept divorce mediation and incorporate it into their practices stems from its capacity to assist attorneys in addressing such
multiple and, at times, contradictory demands.
In particular, we have identified four dimensions of divorce
practice, each involving its own particular challenges. These
dimensions have been abstracted from our data, and thus they
are analytic rather than "folk" categories. They are, however,
firmly anchored in the literature about law practice-in empirical research, in the extensive commentary on practice, and in the
normative literature prescribing codes of professional conduct.
The four dimensions which we examine are (1) pursuing negotiated settlement and preparing for trial, (2) controlling clients
while allowing their participation in decisionmaking, (3) handling nonlegal issues as well as legal issues in the divorce, and (4)
directing the legal process through strong case management. In
the next sections, we describe these dimensions in detail and
draw on our interviews to show how divorce attorneys perceive
mediation as a valuable resource in dealing with the challenges
they pose.
A. Negotiation of Settlement and Preparation for Trial
Lawyers are often characterized as either adversarial or cooperative in their general approach to case resolution. 16 Such ajuxtaposition obscures the frequent necessity in law practice of moving between and combining approaches. Flexibility in approach
is made difficult, however, by the fact that the formal legal process is organized around the steps to trial. Although most cases
ultimately settle through negotiation, lawyers must orchestrate
16 In the substantial literature on lawyer negotiation, it is also common for contrasts
to be drawn between distinctive approaches to settlement-the cooperative (or integrative, problem-solving, principled, value-creating) and the competitive (or distributive, adversarial, positional, value-claiming) styles (Menkel-Meadow 1993).
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negotiation largely on their own, with the occasional help of
court-initiated settlement conferences on the eve of trial.
The demands of trial preparation and of negotiation are not
entirely consistent, despite Marc Galanter's (1984:268) useful
characterization of them as a single process of "litigotiation."
Lawyers must decide, for example, between aggressively using
formal legal procedures such as discovery and embarking on cooperative, informal efforts at information sharing; between taking extreme positions and making "reasonable" offers; between
being open and honest about underlying interests and goals or
keeping them hidden; and between engaging in strategic behavior that imposes costs and pressures on the other party and minimizing posturing and costs for both parties. A key dimension of
divorce law practice involves addressing such choices as these
that are imposed, in part, by the "litigotiation process."
In his analysis of the role of divorce lawyers, Kressel (1985)
identifies this as a "professional dilemma": "While the official
code of conduct prescribes a zealous pursuit of the client's interests, the informal norms and the realities of professional life
prompt compromise and cooperation. Unfortunately, clear
guidelines for helping attorneys decide which path to take are
nonexistent" (1985:59).17 Condlin (1992) concludes that the result of this dilemma is a pattern of negotiation between lawyers
that is adversarial and stylized. That is, it consists of "aggressive
communication maneuvers such as argument, challenge, and demand.., carried out in a slightly exaggerated, somewhat predictable, and essentially impersonal fashion" (pp. 84-85). Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence from a variety of areas of
practice that lawyers generally are settlement-oriented. 18
The character of law practice compounds the challenges for
lawyers of dealing with simultaneous demands for trial preparation and settlement activity-whether through competitive advocacy or cooperation. The press of handling many cases and clients typically prevents sustained attention to any single case until
an official deadline forces it. As a consequence, lawyer-guided negotiation is likely to be episodic and drawn out, proceeding in fits
and starts through exchanges of letters or phone calls, interspersed with consultation with clients. It is not surprising that
empirical research on lawyer negotiation describes much of it as
"low intensity" (Kritzer 1991; Genn 1987). On occasion, of
course, lawyers-particularly those who know and trust each
other-may arrange their own four-person conferences in order
17 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility acknowledges in its preamble the
need for both zealous advocacy and "honest dealing" (Gillers & Simon 1992:6), while the
rules themselves (see, e.g., Rules 3.4 and 4.1) demand at least some sharing of information (ibid., pp. 161-62, 193).
18 See, e.g., Alexander 1992; Sarat & Felstiner 1986; Griffiths 1986; Erlanger et al.
1987.
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to bring lawyers and clients together in sustained negotiation
(Ryan 1992). In other instances, they may delegate to their clients a substantial role in negotiation, although these discussions
may be as acrimonious as the marriage itself (Erlanger et al.
1987).
According to lawyers we interviewed, mandatory mediation
changes the structure of the formal legal process, by adding an
official settlement event that involves parties directly in the negotiation process. Attorneys thus report that mediation encourages
a focus on settlement, in part by preparing their clients for it.
The gathering of lawyers and clients together in the same place
also improves the clarity and efficiency of communication. When
attorneys participate in mediation, they find that the nature of
communication is transformed as well, as mediators set normative restraints on overly aggressive conduct. At the same time,
mediation does not preclude and may even enhance trial preparation. Lawyers especially appreciated mediation for the information it gave them about the other side and for the opportunity to
test out arguments that might be used at trial.
The introduction of mandated mediation into the "litigotiation" process provides a short detour on a road leading to, but
unlikely to reach, trial. It is a tangible event that can create a
sense of urgency about settlement that otherwise may not occur
until a firm trial date looms.' 9 One attorney described this as a
key advantage of mediation:
The other thing that you can't do without mediation is have all
four people in the same place at the same time with some time
limits and the sense of an opportunity which if not taken will be
missed.
The scheduling of a settlement event gives both lawyers and parties an opportunity to think seriously about their goals and encourages serious settlement discussions.
[M]ost lawyers tend not to get ready until they have to... [that
is,] sitting down and focusing on what the issues are. And mediation helps to speed up that process because they've got to be
prepared for that mediation.
The mediation event may also move indecisive clients to make
decisions they have been reluctant to make.
And it also helps, I think, to get the parties ready in a sense, to
be prepared for mediation they really have to give the matters
some thought, think about what they truly want, what they expect out of the process, and it causes them to focus on the real
issues that they might otherwise have been ignoring or just refusing to come to grips with.
19 Other court events may play a similar role to mediation in this regard. For example, preliminary hearings or hearings on temporary motions may lead to informal settlement conferences-typically involving the judge and lawyers but not the parties.
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Nonetheless, not all lawyers are prepared for mediation when
it occurs, thereby diminishing its value as a final settlement device. For example, 39% of Maine lawyers reported their colleagues to be well prepared only "sometimes" or "rarely" at time
of mediation. One of the reasons for incomplete preparation is
that attorneys also recognize that mediation provides opportunities to glean new twists about the case from their own client and
the other party. For a few lawyers, that fact, along with the cost of
substantial preparation, leads them to use mediation as something akin to a client interview. Even when one or both sides are
incompletely prepared for mediation, however, the event itself
focuses attention on settlement and helps launch-if not conclude-negotiation.
Lawyers also commented about how mediation often opens
up communication in ways that facilitate settlement. Chain communication can distort messages as they are passed along from
client to lawyer and lawyer to client (Rubin & Sander 1988).
More than a third of the lawyers interviewed noted that traditional negotiation exchanges among lawyers suffer from inefficiency and miscommunication and praised mediation for the fact
that it brings all four parties together for negotiations. For example,
If you're negotiating, and you're doing letters, which I hate to
do already ... and phone calls, and you're meeting with lawyers, the client's going to get the sense of "Wait, who's doing
this anyway? I didn't say I would do that." And so [mediation] is
a way of covering your tail and involving your client and being
efficient about getting a resolution.
I think ... people regard [mediation] as a good place to do
their negotiations and get them over with in one or two sessions. Everybody's there. You don't have to say, "Well, I've got
to ask my client." If there's any confusion, they're both there to
talk about it. They're both there to disagree, so you don't
lose.... Something isn't lost in the translation.
It gets them face to face with the other side. It eliminates all the
rumors. They tell me what their spouse said their lawyer said;
all that smoke is gone when we sit down in mediation.
A variety of kinds of "smoke" get cleared away in mediation
sessions involving both clients and lawyers, cutting through information barriers that reduce the possibilities for settlement. In
typical negotiations a lawyer has no contact with the other party
and must communicate only through that person's attorney. As a
result, lawyers often do not have good first-hand knowledge of
the priorities and concerns of the party on the other side, important knowledge for effective negotiation.
[Mediation] gives me more of a chance to assess the other side,
who that person is and what are the things [that are important
to them]. If you're working through the attorney, you don't re-
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ally get that feeling of contact until you get to court, which is a
little late.
Lawyers hear their [client's] side of the story, and they start
from that, and they believe in their side of the story, and they
never really understand or fully accept the other side, the other
view of the same situation. If you hear it from the other lawyer,
you don't believe in it as thoroughly as if you're sitting there [in
mediation], and the lawyer and client are spelling it out in a
way that you have to... absolutely listen, and you can't interrupt, and it really gets spun out.
In an adversarial process, a lawyer learns to distrust the portrait
of the other spouse painted by the opposing lawyer. At the same
time, attorneys must remain skeptical of their own client's portrayal of the situation and of the other side (Kressel 1985:164).
The information derived through a face-to-face meeting with
both spouses and lawyers thus fills a vacuum that affects crucial
assessments of the credibility of the other party and lawyer and,
ultimately, of one's own client. With that information, the lawyer
may feel better informed about how to approach settlement effectively as well as how to evaluate the prospects for trial.
The presence of the mediator, the relative formality of the
mediation event, and the ideology of mediation can influence
not only the organization and content but also the tone of discourse between parties and lawyers. Unlike lawyer-to-lawyer or
party-to-party negotiation or even a four-way conference, mediation diminishes the temptation and-especially with mediators
pushing each side to compromise-the ability to behave antagonistically rather than cooperatively.
[I]f I'm dealing with counsel that really wants to be pushy, wants
to get as much as they possibly can and wants to treat the divorce as a true adversarial conflict in which they want to win,
[mediation] sometimes can get them to come around a little
bit.
And I think it's an atmosphere where people are for some reason or another, maybe it's because there's another person in
the room who's neutral. The climate is there for compromise
and if you get, sit in a room with two lawyers, I think, clients
tend to think that they've got these two champions there and
so that's the whole mode. It's just such a different dynamic
when you get into the mediation room.
What it does is .. .bring in somebody who is not just another
totem in the conflict game. It's somebody who is putting a
whole different.., or at least a place where the purpose is not
to encourage conflict, but it is to encourage negotiation, resolution and reaching of common ground.... When you're sitting there with lawyers and clients, unless you've got a really
good lawyer on the other side who's also a negotiator and dedicated to solving problems, you've got a situation which basically
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is an exercise of one side trying to outwit or outdo the other.
It's not, many times, a healthy situation. Mediation is the only
place in the process, as far as I'm concerned, that has got a
healthy opportunity to make people reach common ground.
Mediation thus can subtly change the dynamics of the negotiation enterprise, making adversarial tactics less acceptable and
more difficult to mobilize because a third party can credibly call
their use into question.
Although permitting expressions of anger, the norms of mediation also demand civility and a sense of decorum that may be
lacking in the private interchanges between lawyers or their clients:
They're going to have to sit down across the table and face you
and most of the time they may have been kind of ugly to you
over the phone or the documents you've traded back and forth
may have sounded very aggressive, but when you actually sit
down across the table, it's rare that you get someone who's being [obnoxious].
[L]awyers never talk to each other face to face. It's easy to be
Tarzan over the telephone, it really is. It's real hard to pull that
garbage when the client [is present] ... you can call my client a
slut or a crook over the telephone, but it's real different to have

the guts to do that when they're sitting across from you. A lot of
lawyers who will do that nonsense over the telephone won't do
it in person.

Mediators attempt to discourage lawyers' adversarial or hostile
conduct, and the relative formality and presumed goals of the
mediation session seem to dissuade participants from such behavior.
If mediation provides a settlement detour on the road to
court, it is a scenic route with a clear view of trial. Through their
participation in mediation, lawyers can assess the likely strengths
and weaknesses of a case in court and gain information that may
serve either for settlement or trial (Siemer 1991).
I want to meet the other side, size them up. I want to see what
sort of witness they'd make for the judge. I want a chance to see
how they'd hold up under my questioning. I want to make my
own judgment about whether they're reasonable or unreasonable. I want to watch the other lawyer work with the client....
Essentially I get the same information from mediation I would
at a deposition.... So I'm a big fan of mediation, but maybe

not for all the right reasons.
Although few lawyers so clearly embraced mediation for these
reasons, others referred to mediation as "poor man's discovery"
or "cheap depositions," and most (62%) acknowledged that mediation serves "often" or "sometimes" as trial preparation.
Of course, if one lawyer can use the process for discovery, so
can the other. Thus, several lawyers expressed concern about
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protecting clients from the discovery efforts of other attorneys in
mediation:
I mean, you don't want your client just sitting there baring
their soul because they think that this is somehow something
that's not admissible or that they want to impress the mediator
of whatever emotionally is going on. This isn't the forum to do
that [because the other side is listening].
Once you open your mouth and you say something, it's no
longer confidential. They may not be able to introduce it and
impeach you at a trial, but that doesn't mean they don't know
it. If the other side knows something my client said, I want to
know they said it. And the only way you can know it is you gotta
be there.
Three or four lawyers described mediation as a place to try
out their best trial arguments on a nonpartisan and reasonably
experienced person.
[It is] a chance to see if I've got a salable case here." If the mediator says to me, "Oh, what a load of horseshit that is," then I
rethink my trial strategy. But if the mediator seems to be sympathetic...
[Mediation is] an unofficial game that brings in an independent
person who is qualified to deal with all the various factors of
divorce cases.., and it allows a person to ... give both parties

an unbiased kind of opinion as to any issues in the divorce case.
I think it's the closest thing before going to court you can give
to the parties to try to get a third party's independent opinion
of what might happen.
Thus, even those lawyers most oriented toward trial work found
participation in mandated mediation useful. At the same time,
they, like others, were pressed to consider settlement seriously.
Lawyers' understandings of legal rights and predictions
about likely outcomes at trials cast a strong shadow on the advice
they reported giving about settlement before, during, and after
mediation sessions (see Mnookin & Kornhauser 1979; but see Jacob 1992). Maine lawyers balanced their view of mediation as an
advantageous place to reach settlement with an awareness that
the mediation process could pressure parties into unwise agreements.
I also think I have an obligation to shield my client from a lot of
that pressure. Mediation is like a crucible and bad decisions
can be made.
I've had clients

. . .

who just say, "OK, fine." They agree to

things that maybe they didn't really want to.
Numerous clients will sit down ...

and their position is some-

what unrealistic. And you get them to sit down across the table
from somebody else who's talking reasonably and getting this
person to edge in a little, and the process does work. They start
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them down the road, and they do things. In those situations,
before we get an agreement, .. . I want to talk to my client, and
say, "Do you agree? Are you sure you don't feel pressured by
this? These are the things you said you weren't going to concede; you've conceded some of them. Is this what you want to
do? You're entitled to do it and I think it will work (if I do feel
that way), but just make sure you're not being pressured.
I never send my client without me because I worry that the
pressure of the mediation will make my client make an agreement without talking to me. And I sometimes want to take him
or her out in the hall and go [slapping noise], "Straighten up!
You've given something away we don't have to give away yet!"
Consistent with the concerns of critics of divorce mediation (e.g.,
Fineman 1991; Grillo 1991; Bryan 1992), Maine lawyers said they
knew of clients who had experienced the pressure or "momentum" of mediation or "being browbeaten" by particular
mediators who were too concerned with getting a settlement. But
the lawyers saw themselves as playing the role of rights-oriented
advocate, advising and protecting their clients during the mediation process.
Thus, attorneys in Maine have found that mandated mediation assists them in moving toward settlement while simultaneously advocating for rights and even preparing for trial. Most lawyers praised mediation for the useful focus it provides for
settlement activity by diminishing some of the barriers to communication, information sharing, and understanding that often
arise in unstructured negotiation. At the same time, the lawyers
viewed mediation as good preparation for the eventuality of trial,
allowing them to assess the strengths of the other side and to use
the session for informal discovery purposes.
B. Controlling Decisionmaking

Another key dimension of legal practice lies in the complex
relation between lawyer and client, in particular the balance that
must be struck between lawyer and client control over decisionmaking. According to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Rule 1.4(b)), "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation" (Gillers & Simon 1992:31).20
Yet, according to Gordon (1988:10), "One often hears as well
that to assure effective representation the lawyer must be able to
20 However, the Comment that follows also notes that "a lawyer ordinarily cannot be
expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail" and that "Practical exigency
may also require a lawyer to act for a client without prior consultation" (Gillers & Simon
1992:31). According to one commentator, "The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
although ostensibly favoring client control, also are ambiguous, and do not resolve the
question of decisionmaking authority" (Strauss 1987:319 n.25; see also Berger 1987:
1316).
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'control' the client-to assert exclusive or final decision-making
authority on strategic or tactical issues." 21 The traditional model
of lawyer-client interaction presumes that lawyers direct decisionmaking and that clients play a fairly passive role, but concerns
about problems created by lawyer dominance have led scholars
recently to articulate a more "client-centered" model (e.g. Rosenthal 1974; Ellman 1987; Binder, Bergman, & Price 1991). Rather
than seeing the lawyer-client interaction as an either/or matter,
Felstiner and Sarat (1992) emphasize the fluidity inherent in the
relationship. Thus, they argue that "power in lawyer client interactions is less stable, predictable, and clear-cut than the conventional view holds... [and that] it is continuously enacted and reenacted" (p. 1454). We agree, and see the issue of lawyer-client
control to be one of the most central in law practice.
Precisely because the professional expertise of the lawyer may
make it difficult for clients to exercise decisionmaking authority
(Ellmann 1987), attorneys must constantly demonstrate their
identification with a client's interests and needs. Lawyers thus
may build client trust by accepting and supporting a client's
world-view. At the same time, however, lawyers must try to act as
objective and skeptical advisors. The skeptic's role often means
telling clients things they do not want to hear and urging compromise, thus placing in jeopardy the clients' trust in them as
vigorous allies (Davis 1988). As one divorce lawyer put it, "I tell
people, 'you want me to tell you what you want to hear or you
want me to tell you the truth?' Sometimes it's hard to do [the
latter]." 2 2 Thus, issues of confidence, trust, and independence
are closely related to the dimension of control in the lawyer-client relationship.
The problems of managing the balance between lawyer and
client control are at least as great in negotiation as in formal
legal proceedings. 23 When lawyers take on a major role in negoti21 Social scientists have documented some of the pressures toward, conditions for,
and consequences of lawyer or client control (O'Gorman 1963; Rosenthal 1974; Heinz &
Laumann 1982; Olson 1984; Kressel 1985; Sarat & Felstiner 1986, 1988; and Felstiner &
Sarat 1992).
22 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct acknowledge this difficulty in the call
to "render candid advice" (Rule 2.1). The comment notes that "a lawyer should not be
deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to
the client" (Gillers & Simon 1992:134).
Another discussion of this dilemma is found in the American Bar Association Section of Legal Eduation & Admissions to the Bar's (1992) summary of lawyering skills. That
report notes that the skill of "counseling" involves "the lawyer's need to strike a proper

balance between two conflicting considerations"-maintaining the lawyer's dispassion
and objectivity while also communicating to the client a commitment to the client's goals

and interests (pp. 177-78).
23 Bundy (1992:47) notes: "For the client to exercise effective control in negotiation, however, either the client must be sufficiently motivated to bargain with her lawyer
in order to obtain control, or her lawyer must adhere to a 'client-control' approach to
practice. For clients who are not that effective or fortunate, negotiation may pose greater
risks of loss of control than adjudication." See also Condlin (1992), who points out that
"the information and understanding necessary to make [the] determination [of a client's
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ating a divorce, clients can easily lose track of where things are
because they are not privy to phone exchanges between attorneys
and may find it difficult to penetrate and interpret legal correspondence. Clients are distanced from settlement activities by the
reliance on lawyers as intermediaries for exchange and interpretation of information. Frequently, in response to the sense of exclusion, clients demand the time and attention of their lawyers,
wondering what has happened or, more likely, not happened
and why.
Lawyers in Maine report that mandated mediation gives
them new ways both to share information and decisionmaking
with clients and to influence client decisions. In the lawyers' view,
mediation is particularly useful because it supports their efforts
to reshape client expectations. Further, lawyers recognize that
mediation involves their clients directly in the actual settlement
process but at the same time permits the attorney to supervise
that participation.
The fact that lawyers use mediation to reinforce selectively
the advice that clients resist hearing was remarked on by over
half of the Maine lawyers with whom we spoke.
I can't force my client to do something the client is uncomfortable with. I'm not there to argue the other person's case.
Whereas at mediation, it's an opportunity for my client to kind
of expose his or her case to reality and the mediator many
times is going to say, "Wait, is that what you really mean? Do
you really think a judge is going to listen to this? Listen, I've
just heard it for the first time and let me tell you what my reaction is." And you're kind of exposing.., and many times when
you say it to your attorney, it will be received, obviously, differently from just a completely disinterested person.
In other words, you can say [to a client], "You can't get that,"
and go to mediation, the mediation takes place, and this and
that, and it shows that it's not only my ideas. Then I can come
out and say, well, I told you. It gives them almost a second opinion.
What [mediators] do is lend sort of an objective ear before it
gets to the court, the parties can try out their positions on the
mediator, and even though the mediator isn't a judge and usually isn't that schooled in the law actually, they get a gut feeling,
the client does, for how the mediator's reacting to whatever
they're saying. And if the mediator is sort of leaning on them
and saying "You're really taking an extreme position," or "I really don't think that's appropriate" or whatever, it's a lot easier
to you as a lawyer to make that same observation to a client
without a client feeling either that you're against them or somehow you're no longer their advocate.
bargaining interests] change constantly as bargaining proceeds" (p. 30). As a result,
Condlin argues, lawyers who negotiate without their clients being present typically assume
the client wants to maximize his or her tangible benefits.
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Probably one of the biggest things is [mediation] puts the client
in touch with reality in some instances. Where I'm not successful in driving home the point that the client is being unreasonable, where the client maybe suspects that I don't have his or
her interests fully at heart.
I find if I'm telling the client something and they're not listening to me, they hear the same thing from somebody else ....
sometimes it clicks.
One theme in these comments about mediation from lawyers is
their concern with promoting reasonableness in their clients and
their perception that the need to remain a credible advocate limits their own capacity to do so.2 4 What mediators say-often presumably in the franker private sessions with one party and lawyer-can be mobilized selectively and effectively to guide clients
toward positions the lawyer views as realistic. At the same time,
lawyers reserve the right to advise their clients against "unreasonable" suggestions or pressures from mediators. In this way, mediation may actually enhance lawyer power and control over clients.
The potential for conflicts between the lawyer's role as client
advocate and as reality tester is particularly great where there are
children in a divorce. On the one hand, lawyers expressed almost
universal appreciation of the recent child-support guidelines because they provided a clear guide to clients who resisted payment
or wanted much more than allowed. By contrast, the law's "best
interests of the child standard" for child custody casts a very weak
shadow (Jacob 1992), leaving lawyers hard-pressed to counter
their clients' "unreasonable expectations" with clear corrective
guidance. The heavy emotional charge attached to children
makes it especially hard for lawyers to challenge their clients on
these issues, particularly without strong legal grounds. Mediation, however, may provide a context to broach these issues
safely. As one lawyer noted, "A mediator.., can talk about what's
in the best interest of the child in a way that an attorney can't."
In Maine mediators have seen it as their responsibility to help
parties reach agreements that are in the best interests of children, an objective reflected in the Court Mediation Service's recently issued statement of purpose. As a result, mediators ask parents to think carefully about whether the arrangements they
propose advance the interests of children. Thus, it is not surpris24 The law office talk reported by Sarat and Felstiner (1986) echoes with this role
conflict and attempts to manage it by the lawyer. By questioning the certainty of law and
the wisdom ofjudicial decisions and other legal actors in those conversations, the lawyer
is trying to encourage "reasonable" expectations on the part of the client withoutjeopardizing his or her tenuous role as advocate and loyal ally. Blaming someone else proves a
useful tool. Sarat and Felstiner interpret this pattern differently. In their interpretation,
these efforts are aimed at encouraging a perception of lawyer power and influence because of their strategic ability to influence decisionmakers. In their recent work, Felstiner
and Sarat (1992) present a more qualified view of lawyer power.
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ing that, on custody and visitation issues especially, but on other
matters as well, Maine lawyers identified mediators as useful allies
in reality testing with their clients.
Although mediation may strengthen lawyer control in some
ways through its reinforcement of attorney advice, it also can give
parties greater opportunity to participate in what otherwise can
be a fairly remote and mysterious process of seeking settlement.
At the very least, it opens up the process to observation by clients.
I think it makes them feel like they're more in control of the
situation because they're involved, they're not out there in left
field while the attorneys are working on it. They're right there.
Ijust think it's really helpful for them to see the process, to see
the give and take on both sides rather than having them always
feel like, I'm giving again, I'm giving again.
Typically, according to Maine divorce lawyers, clients do far more
than listen in mediation; indeed, attorneys reported encouraging
clients to take an active role in the process.
I'm much more inclined to let the client talk in the mediation
room.... My experience has been that sometimes that room is
the first time [since the marital breakdown] that clients have
been face to face, or it's one of the few times they have the
opportunity to be face to face, and they need to get some stuff
off their chest, and it can be done in that setting safely and
usefully.
I want to sit back and listen, and I'm not going to interrupt
unless I feel that you've misstated something or you're misinformed on an area or need some counseling.
I tell them ahead of time that I'm there to protect them if I
think things are not being run fairly, and to watch out for their
interest, but primarily it's them, the mediator, and the other
spouse. And most of the attorneys I deal with apparently work
the same way because everybody sits there, doesn't do all the
talking, sits there and lets them work it out.
Although almost all the lawyers we interviewed permitted-and
preferred-clients to play the lead role in mediation, there were
four or five exceptions. These attorneys, for example, described
their efforts to take over at each mediation session:
I tell the client that our first objective is to listen a lot, and to
say very little; that I'll do most of the talking; that if the client is
talking and I start to talk over him or her, I want him to stop in
the middle of the word "of'; that anytime I'm going off in a
direction they don't like, they should tell me that they want a
caucus, and we'll go out in the hall and have a private session,
and that I'll feel free to do the same thing. I mean basically, I
want to be in absolute control of our side.
I dominate every mediation.... Some clients won't talk at all;
some clients by choice want you to talk; some clients I don't
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want them to talk; some clients, I'll say, you want to say something, go right ahead, but I don't defer to my client. If I have
something to say, I say it, and I control the mediation almost all

the time.
The conduct of these exceptional lawyers was not particularly admired by their colleagues.
My feelings about the role the attorney should play at mediation [is that it] should be a more passive one than an active
one.... You know, I don't like it when I go and I've been to
mediations where the attorney does all the talking.
In talking about the advantages of mediation, one-third of
our sample mentioned its value in facilitating party involvement
and the specific opportunity it provided for parties to meet and
to talk with one another. At the same time, almost every Maine
lawyer we interviewed conceded that he or she sometimes had to
play the central role in mediation sessions because certain clients
could not-or would not-play that role themselves. Unlike voluntary mediation, where more willing and articulate parties selfselect into the process, mandatory mediation draws in quite diverse parties. For example,
It depends on the client, but I'll tell them, if you want to talk,
feel free to talk. The mediator would rather have you talk, but
if you prefer me to talk, that's fine.
If I've got a shrinking violet, I guess I do most of the talking. If
I've got somebody that has some opinions and wants to say
something, because sometimes in divorce cases somebody really wants to say something, what they think of a person because they've been stepping out behind their back for the past
year, and my attitude is, say it in mediation. That's the safest
place to say it.
Some lawyers differentiated cases not just by the needs or desires
of their clients but by the identity of the mediator or the opposing counsel as well.
I like to play the role of adviser, supportive adviser, but that's
not always possible--depends on who the mediator is, depends
on what the tenor of the mediation is. There are some where I
play negotiator, and I don't let my client speak.
In sum, Maine lawyers valued mediation because it involves
their clients directly-but under supervision-in discussing settlement, hearing the other side, and weighing the reasonableness
of each party's position. Yet, lawyers also recognized that the active role of mediators in challenging parties and their positions
can also reinforce the lawyer's influence over the client. Thus,
Maine's mandated mediation appears to assist attorneys in increasing client participation in negotiation while simultaneously
reinforcing the lawyer's professional role as guide, adviser, and
advocate.
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C. Handling Nonlegal and Legal Issues

Divorce lawyers must repeatedly examine nonlegal issues at
the same time that they work to frame problems in legal terms
and give legal advice. That means that divorce practice demands
both technical knowledge about legal rules and procedures and
an ability to assist parties in dealing with issues for which the law
and legal training provide little guidance. The turmoil of many
divorces draws lawyers into the private lives of their clients, while
the substantive issues of divorce often involve practical assessments of living arrangements and of children's needs. Although
a primary task of lawyers is to translate personal troubles into
legal issues,2 5 lawyers also face demands to offer personal advice
and to situate their legal advice in a broader context.2 6 Thus,
central to legal practice is a dimension that moves lawyers back
and forth from dealing with technical 27legal issues to counseling
clients about their problems of living.
These problems of living include a wide range of issues for
which there is no clear-cut solution that would result from the
application of legal rules. Such nonlegal issues include, for example, making future household arrangements, dividing up personal property, and arranging the details of child visitation
schedules. The issues also include coping with the client's emotional distress over the broken relationship or fear of an insecure
and uncertain future.
In divorce cases a failure to deal with these nonlegal issues
may prevent the attorney from getting her legal work accomplished. For example, angry and upset clients can be "unreasonable" and may resist settlement or demand legal tactics that, in the
lawyer's view, have no chance of success. Alternatively, a client
may want to give up on some legal entitlements to speed resolution or to deal with guilt over ending a marriage. Divorce attorneys thus struggle to manage emotional clients and to find ways
to work through that emotion, deflecting it, suppressing it, or
venting and putting it behind. Squabbles over the details of property division or visitation schedules-issues not demanding the
technical expertise of attorneys-may also prevent settlement of
25 The literature about law as translation and dispute transformation emphasizes
this theme. See, e.g., Cain 1979; Mather & Yngvesson 1980-81; Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat
1980-81; Cunningham 1989.
26 Kressel (1985:89-92) and Davis (1988:89-92) both describe the difficulties lawyers face in dealing with nonlegal issues. Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct notes that in rendering candid legal advice, "a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may
be relevant to the client's situation" (Gillers & Simon 1992:134). The Comment following

this rule suggests also that "[m]atters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in
the domain of another profession" (ibid., p. 135).
27 Similar descriptions of the open-ended and uncertain nature of problems in
legal cases are found in Rosenthal's (1974) study of personal injury cases and, more recently, in Flood's (1991) study of business cases.
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the divorce. Thus, divorce lawyers cannot easily confine their
work to the technical questions about law and legal practice with
which some may feel most comfortable.
Unfortunately, the processes of legal representation and of
lawyer-guided negotiation leave little room or structure for parties to meet face to face to deal with emotional issues or to work
through the details of property or visitation. In fact, when emotions run high, lawyers may be particularly prone to discourage
contact between divorcing parties. Instead, clients' sessions with
lawyers themselves may become the major outlet for pent-up
emotions. Yet, few lawyers encourage their clients unendingly to
pour out their feelings to them, and few clients have the resources to afford doing so.
Similarly, traditional legal representation and lawyer-guided
negotiation do not provide a structure for direct meetings between clients to decide the "pots and pans" issues. Although
many lawyers encourage clients to work through such problems
on their own, not all couples can do so. In fact, the more troublesome these issues are and the stronger the anger felt at the divorce, the more volatile and unproductive the private negotiations between parties are likely to be (Erlanger et al. 1987).
In this context, mediation may provide a setting where anger
and feelings about the other spouse can find an outlet. Roughly a
quarter of the Maine lawyers we interviewed observed that media28
tion serves this role.
I guess it gives them a chance before [trial] to get their side out
and hear the other side, maybe it's cathartic, I don't know.
And I think sometimes a mediator can be very helpful in getting the two sides to work out their anger, to talk with each
other and not at each other.
[M]ore often, I think you can accomplish more by sitting down,
letting the parties put some stuff on the table. Maybe they've
got an issue that's totally unrelated to what's really got to be
decided. And maybe you can get that out and get it out of the
way. Maybe she's just upset because he's running around with
another woman. Maybe we can get that sting out. Maybe we can
address that.
Mediation can give the parties a chance to work through or even
just to voice strong emotions to one another or to some official
third party. Clients' opportunity to express these feelings in mediation may also relieve the lawyer of the burden of hearing
them privately; and by relying on mediation to provide outlets
for their expression, the lawyer can more easily focus attention
on reaching settlement.
28 Four lawyers we spoke to, however, tried instead to protect their clients against
this aspect of mediation and counseled them to avoid emotional outbursts.
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Mediation sessions also lend themselves to pursuing those issues that lawyers may view as trivial yet crucial to divorcing parties. Lawyers generally acknowledged the value of mediation in
working through property division and visitation arrangements.
The potential in mediation to work out these intricate problems
leads to greater detail in mediated divorce agreements, according to 10 of the lawyers we interviewed. As a result, according to
one lawyer,
You've got some real sausage-looking agreements, I'll tell you,
some real strange looking beasts because of what was perceived
to be a real concern of the parties, or one party even, but that
they reached agreement on.... [V]isitation schedules... are

often the bulk of a divorce judgment now.
Five lawyers expressed the frustration or impatience felt, we suspect by many, at having to be present when the parties worked
on these nonlegal issues in mediation.
What's a lawyer going to do with pots and pans? Why should a
lawyer get involved whether it's Friday at five or Sunday at six?
That's ridiculous. I mean clients aren't babies, but the trend is
more and more [lawyers] going [to mediation].
But then there are some things, if they're talking about visitation times, if they're talking about dividing up the personal
property, I don't need to be there for that.
By becoming engaged in the mediation process, thus, lawyers
have become involved in assisting their clients in discussions of
nonlegal issues that at least some attorneys would prefer to dele29
gate to the parties themselves.
Indeed, the primary role that attorneys saw for themselves in
mediation was to advise their clients in dealing with legal issues
such as property division and in guarding against loss of legal
entitlements. As one lawyer put it, the role is that "of a watchdog."
I wouldn't let a mediator steamroll a client into the decision on
a financial issue where everything hadn't been disclosed or certain issues needed to be explored.
If it is a mediator who I'm very comfortable with understanding
the law and not strong-arming my client, I will sit back more. If
it is a mediator who I'm not as comfortable with, I tend to be
more involved. I am there to get my client out (of mediation]
when I feel they need to talk to me or be advised and when
they're either caving in or getting angry.
29 In his study of English solicitors, Davis (1988) found in them the same distaste
for issues where the law provided less guidance. It would appear that a common resolution of this conflict for many lawyers is to encourage clients to negotiate on their own the
pots-and-pans issues as well as issues relating to children. To the extent that this occurs, it
exposes clients to unmediated exchanges with spouses that may be particularly likely to
reflect bargaining imbalances.
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Lawyers thus saw mediation as another forum for advising clients
about legal rights.
In unusual instances, a mediator initiates a discussion of legal
issues or suggests alternatives that nudge an inexperienced lawyer into new areas. Given that a significant proportion of the lawyers in divorce cases do only a few such cases a year (McEwen,
Maiman, & Mather 1991), one or both lawyers in a case may not
know recent developments in domestic relations law. Mediation
can, on occasion, provide an opportunity to learn about the law
either from the other lawyer or, indirectly, from the mediator.
Mediation gives attorneys the chance to meet face to face and
discuss interesting legal points. We really do, . . like the last
mediation I went to, quite frankly, the other attorney really
didn't understand transmutation, so we get the chance to discuss that.
Mediators around here now are very knowledgeable, and they
don't practice law, but in the mediation ... there are lawyers
who don't do a lot of divorce work, and when they come into
the mediation process they really learn something from the
mediators about fine-tuning. A mediator will say, "OK, well,
we've agreed on alimony, but how are we going to insure the
alimony?" And you can see that a lawyer who doesn't do much
[divorce work] says, "Oh, hey, that's a good idea." And then the
other lawyer isn't necessarily going to tell them that.
Thus, in mediation, Maine lawyers have an opportunity to
guide their clients through the often intertwined legal and nonlegal issues of a divorce. By giving an outlet for parties to meet
one another and to express their feelings, mediation can assist
attorneys in moving their clients beyond these emotional issues
and toward "reasonable" settlement. At the same time, mediation
may unite the discussions of children, of pots and pans issues,
and of financial matters, and thus pressure those lawyers who
prefer to concentrate only on "legal" issues to support clients in
the "nonlegal" areas of controversy as well. Finally, far from precluding examination of legal issues-typically surrounding financial matters-mediation provides lawyers with another forum in
which to discuss and examine them.
D. Directing the Legal Process
Legal cases move forward with varying degrees of direction by
and attention from attorneys. The timing of cases, amount of
contact with clients, extent of litigation activity, intensity of settlement effort, and cost vary from case to case and from lawyer to
lawyer (Davis 1988), The ability of attorneys to manage a case
closely is limited by the fact that they cannot control the behavior
of the other party. Nor can they control the calendars of courts.
Perhaps most important, each case competes for attention with
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other cases on which a lawyer is working. Work on particular
cases, therefore, may be concentrated in the periods just before
official deadlines. A case may get a period of intense attention as
an attorney takes charge to try to move it along before another
case takes its place. Kressel (1985:105-9) notes the struggle of divorce lawyers to control the pace of litigation, while Kritzer
(1991) portrays negotiation in general litigation as highly fractured activity as lawyers give particular cases attention and then
turn to others. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct respond to this circumstance with Rule 1.3, which asserts: "A lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client" (Gillers & Simon 1992:28). The Comment includes
the observation that "Perhaps no professional shortcoming is
more widely resented than procrastination" (ibid., p. 28). Ne30
glect is often cited as the most common violation of the rules.
Divorce cases are no exception to the pressures that work
against close case management. The lawyers we interviewed reported that the efforts to keep control over the course of any
single divorce can easily be overwhelmed by the press of handling many cases:
Any attorney worth his salt is probably right out straight and
they're handling or juggling 100-200 cases at a time. And just
by a matter of sheer time, unless they get focused in on a particular case, the case isn't going to get resolved.
The file goes in the drawer and nothing happens, unless one
lawyer or the other keeps the ball rolling.
These uncertainties in case processing create significant headaches for both lawyers and their clients. Clients understandably
see their divorce as of primary importance and may call regularly
to find out what is happening. Their lawyers, faced with the crush
of many cases, the unpredictable responses of opposing party
and counsel, and the slowness of court scheduling, may delay or
avoid responding because the answer is "nothing."
In the context of a struggle to manage and move cases, lawyers view mandated mediation as offering new opportunities for
structure and control of cases. A mandated process would appear
at first to diminish lawyer control of cases by giving it up to the
court. But in practice, mediation in Maine typically takes place at
the initiative of one (or both) lawyers in a case. The mandate
applies in two ways: mediation must have been completed for the
parties to have a contested hearing; and one party's request for
mediation compels the participation of the other side. Thus, instead of being automatic, mandated mediation, as it operates in
30 The recent American Bar Association report on legal education and professional
development lists "organization and management of legal work" as one of the 10 fundamental lawyering skills and describes it as "an essential precondition for competent practice" (American Bar Association Section of Legal Education & Admissions to the Bar
1992:199-203).
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Maine, opens up new strategic opportunities for lawyers that can
diminish some of the uncertainty in case management.
Initiating mediation serves several strategic goals for Maine
divorce lawyers. First, by requesting mediation, they get the attention of the other party and ensure that some sustained attention
is given to settlement early in the case.
The problem cases were the ones where you couldn't get the
other attorney's attention.
[Mediation] moves the process along because it, for the unprepared attorney, it forces the attorney to become prepared, or at
least to come to face the fact, that, okay, we're going to have to
deal with these issues in this divorce.
Sometimes, you cannot get the other lawyer to make a commitment, you can't, they just want to march right into court, and
[mediation] gets the other side to see that, that their own lawyer
is [blocking settlement].
When the other side does not return phone calls or respond to
letters, mediation compels a response. In so doing, it gives one
attorney some control over delays that result from simple
3
nonresponsiveness or from strategic choice on the other side. '
A second strategy for lawyers is to employ mediation in an
effort to rein in an attorney on the other side who is "out of control," behaving like a "pit bull" or a "mad dog litigator." 32 By making "unreasonable" demands or by proceeding with burdensome
and costly discovery and motions, one side can quickly drive up
the costs and "temperature" of the case. A rapid move into mediation literally forces the other party to the bargaining table,
where with a mediator's help, there is at least some modest prospect of deescalation:
If I am dealing with counsel that really wants to be pushy, wants
to get as much as they possibly can and wants to treat the divorce as a true adversarial conflict in which they want to win,
[mediation] sometimes can get them to come around a little
bit.
If it's a case where I think it's important that the other party
needs to be grabbed by the collar and shook a little bit, then I'll
opt for mediation as soon as possible.
31

Such delays produce differential pressures on divorcing parties to reduce their

demands and to settle. These pressures are exacerbated by a system in which one party
can unilaterally put off serious discussion of settlement until the eve of the long-distant
trial. As Erlanger et al. (1987:597) note, "As in other negotiation settings... a lack of
cooperation often prompts more generous settlement offers or a reduction in demands
from impatient negotiators."
32 Lawyers we interviewed in both states differentiated the divorce bar into those
attorneys who were "reasonable" and those who were exceptions to that norm, such as
those who acted to escalate conflict through their aggressive personalities or overemphasis on litigation. For detailed discussion of these different lawyer types among the New
Hampshire bar, see Mather et al. 1991.
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Selective use of mediation to assert some control over a case
itself requires that an attorney be sufficiently familiar with cases
to know when mediation should be requested. Such case-by-case
use of mediation was quite common in one court we studied, but
in several others, attorneys reported invoking the process almost
automatically in cases that had even the slightest prospect of being contested. These lawyers thus effectively structured the divorce process, creating deadlines for themselves and their clients
for production of information and the identification of negotiation goals. In contrast to arm's-length negotiation by letter or
phone-which has no clear starting or ending point-mediation
can create a sense of urgency. Once requested, it also does not
require the initiative of either party, thus imposing a structure on
the movement of the case.
About a quarter of the attorneys we interviewed complained
that mediation was regularly invoked too early and produced "laziness"-a reluctance to negotiate seriously before entering mediation.
I think mediation is usually the introduction to negotiation. I
very rarely find lawyers negotiating before mediation ... [because of] laziness. You don't do anything you don't have to do.
In my practice, I don't make unnecessary work for me. And for
me to send out a proposal, when we're going to mediate and
probably dash it on the rocks below, is worthless.
And something that we fall more and more back to is not negotiating until we get to mediation, not doing any serious negotiating until then .... I mean, it isn't done. I mean, it is done in
certain cases, but ... you know, whereas we used to sort of get
together as lawyers and sit down and try to negotiate, I think
the attitude is now, like, "Well, there's a mediator available to
help us do that, we have to go through the mediation requirement anyway, let's use that as a forum. You know, why spend a
client's money negotiating, not getting anywhere, and then
having to mediate?
But, increasingly, I'm finding that other attorneys use mediation as the first step. You kind of don't need to negotiate. You
kind of don't need to share information. Just go to mediation,
which is very frustrating for me.
The structure that mediation provides for exchanging information and discussing settlement helps lawyers to direct an otherwise haphazard and uncertain negotiation process. Not surprisingly, then, some lawyers are drawn to the practice of invoking it
automatically and of employing mediation to replace as much as
possible of the unstructured negotiation process.
At the same time that Maine's mandated mediation provides
a mechanism to structure negotiation, it threatens a lawyer's control over the hours devoted to a case and its consequent cost to
the client. The Maine lawyers we interviewed were about evenly
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divided between those who thought that mediation raised the
costs of divorce and those who thought it saved money. But,
whatever the overall impact, it was clear that the mediation fee,
and the time required to prepare for and attend mediation, could
add substantially to the cost of an inexpensive divorce, although
the impact might not be noticed on more complicated and expensive cases. As a result, lawyers with working- and middle-class
clients, in particular, worried about using mediation unnecessarily or prematurely.
Two strategies permitted cost control in the face of the prospect of mediation. First, lawyers could work harder to settle the
case on their own, prior to any mediation. The fact that the proportion of divorce cases mediated declined by about 25% in
Maine after a $60 fee for mediation was imposed suggests that
lawyers (and their clients) do exercise some self-control in using
mediation. Second, some attorneys appear to have solved the
cost problem by cutting back on preparation and negotiation
prior to mediation, knowing that the mediation process was relatively forgiving and, in fact, a good way of learning a considerable
amount about the case.
The introduction of mandated mediation in Maine thus has
opened up new opportunities for lawyers both to establish and to
lose control over the management of divorce cases. The largely
favorable views of mediation among the Maine divorce bar reflect the general sense that it improves case management while,
at the same time, assisting lawyers in dealing simultaneously with
trial preparation and settlement, client participation and professional direction, and legal and nonlegal issues. Moreover, by examining lawyers' perceptions of mediation and its utility to them,
we understand better the fluid nature of divorce law practice.
IV. Law Practice Transformed?
Binary conceptions of lawyers' approaches to practice as
either adversarial or problem-solving lead to dramatic questions
about transformation and cooptation. Has the blending of mediation and the work of divorce lawyers in Maine "transformed" law
practice or have attorneys simply "coopted" and "legalized" mediation (Menkel-Meadow 1991)? The degree to which new procedures change the way lawyers work is an important question.
However, since we conceive of both divorce law practice and mediation as containing elements of adversariness and problem-solving, we think it appropriate to look not for radical transformation but for evidence of modest changes in the balance between
these and other elements.
To address this question of change, we present longitudinal
data from Maine court dockets, as well as retrospective assessments of Maine lawyers and comparative data from attorney in-
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terviews and court dockets from neighboring New Hampshire.
These data provide several points of comparison as we try to understand the impact of divorce mediation on the character of
divorce law practice in Maine.
There were 63 Maine lawyers among our interviewees (72%
of our sample) who had been in practice before the introduction
of mandatory mediation in 1984. Over 90% of them believed that
mandatory mediation had changed the practice of divorce law in
Maine. They described changes both in their own attitudes and
practices and in those of the divorce bar more generally. Many
lawyers described movement from initial suspicion and resistance
to eventual broad acceptance of mediation:
I remember when mandatory mediation first came and there
was a huge crowd against it: "They're trying to do away with the
lawyers." All that sort of stuff.
I think before mediation really became well accepted.., there
were lawyers in the beginning who walked out of mediation....
[E]very damn time my partner or I mediated with [-],
he
would leave. He would storm out of the room with this big
flourish, and we never got anywhere. I mean that's just the way
that some lawyers approached mediation. Thank God, we've
gotten over that. It's accepted because it has to be, and really
because people realize how useful and important it really is.
[I supported mediation when it was mandated] because I mediated a whole bunch of cases before that, and I found amazingly
it worked. Amazingly it worked. But I will tell you a lot of lawyers in who hated it have now come around and agree
that it does make a difference.
Some lawyers noted that the conversion of the attorneys skeptical about mediation appeared to have been accompanied by a
shift away from trial orientation and adversariness and toward
settlement and cooperation.
When we first began mediating, I think there was a lot of resistance. Lawyers viewed it as, some lawyers viewed it as illegal. It
was not in any way part of the adversarial process and required
people to put down their guard, and lawyers will go to mediation and be advocates and be trial lawyers and you accomplish
nothing. But I do think that over time we've all become acclimated to it.
I think it's made lawyers more humane. I think it's made lawyers see that they can get a good result for their client . . .
through compromise and mediation. And I think that was important for lawyers to see that and feel okay about that. That
they didn't give up their lawyering to this process. I think it's
made us all better problem solvers which I think is what the
practice of law is all about.
That such observations reflect more than wishful thinking is
suggested by responses to one of the closed-ended questions in
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our lawyer interviews. We sought to learn how lawyers balance
the simultaneous demands for cooperative and adversarial approaches to settlement. We asked: "When you are negotiating a
divorce case, would you say your primary goal is best described as
reaching a settlement fair to both parties or getting as much as
possible for your client?" 33 More than 40% of the lawyers (among
both our Maine and New Hampshire interviewees) refused to accept the forced choice and found clever ways of combining the
possibilities, for example, "reaching a settlement fair to my client." Such answers were coded as "mixed." As Table 1 indicates,
however, Maine attorneys differed significantly in their answers
to this question from a comparable group of New Hampshire
lawyers we had also interviewed.3 4 Maine lawyers were considerably more likely to select the fair settlement goal, while New
Hampshire lawyers more often chose getting the most for the
client. This cross-state difference holds up under a variety of controls for divorce specialization and gender of lawyer. Among the
possible explanations for the cross-state difference is the fact that
Maine divorce lawyers had nearly a decade of experience with
divorce mediation, while New Hampshire attorneys had little di35
rect contact with mediation.
In addition, the divorce dockets of the two states provide evidence of behavioral change consistent with this attitudinal pattern. We coded from the docket books the presence or absence
of various kinds of legal activity by one or both parties suggesting
legal disputation. These involved motions-for example, for temporary custody or support, for discovery, to compel discovery, for
contempt, for temporary orders-and other actions such as filing
of objections or submission of memoranda in support of arguments.3 6 As Table 2 shows, in New Hampshire the average total
33 This question was added after several interviews had been completed. In some
interviews it was not asked because of the press of time. Several answers were uncodable.
Thus, we have data for 136 of 163 interviews.
34 Divorce law practices in Maine and New Hampshire are generally similar. Most
divorce lawyers work as sole practitioners or in small firms, and do so in smaller towns or
modest-sized urban centers. Their practices concentrate in courts where they meet the
same attorneys repeatedly. The work of lawyers in both states varies from case to case and
attorney to attorney along common dimensions. For example, practitioners with well-todo clients behave somewhat differently from those with working-class clients; divorce specialists tend to view their work somewhat differently than do general practitioners for
whom divorce work is far lower in volume (McEwen et al. 1991).
35 New Hampshire lawyers' experience with divorce mediation was limited; 19% of
those interviewed reported that they had never had a client who had been involved in
divorce mediation, while 53% reported having only between one and five clients who had
used mediation. This limited contact with mediation typically came at three points. A few
lawyers referred people to mediation, often instead of taking the cases themselves. In
other instances, lawyers reviewed for legal adequacy agreements that had been reached in
mediation. Several lawyers also reported having represented clients whose mediation efforts had proved disastrous and who were seeking to undo the results.
36 An inclusive list of the motions employed in at least one of the two states follows:
motions to amend, for temporary custody, for temporary support, payment of attorney's
fees, appointment of guardian ad litem, for protection from abuse, to compel discovery,
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Table 1. Lawyer's Self-reported Negotiation Goal by State
Maine

New Hampshire

Total

Fair settlement
Mixed
Most for client

39.5%
44.7%
15.8%

(30)
(34)
(12)

28.3%
38.3%
33.3%

(17)
(23)
(20)

34.6%
41.9%
23.5%

(47)
(57)
(32)

Total

55.9%

(76)

44.1%

(60)

100.0%

(136)

X'=5.92 with 2 degrees of freedom, p=.05
Table 2. Average Number of "Adversarial" Divorce Motions per Case by State
and Year

Maine
New Hampshire

1979

1980

1983

1984

1985

1986

1988

1.07

1.14
.77

1.18

.95
.87

.82

.89

.92
1.06

frequency of such motions per case grew from 1980 to 1988. In

Maine, by contrast, it fell significantly (averaging 20% lower after
mediation took effect) with the advent of mandated mediation in

1984. 3 7 Although far from definitive, these data suggest that the
introduction of mediation may have reduced the extent of for-

mal legal contention in divorce in Maine. 38 Because the drop in
such activity coincided with the mandate, it appears to be associ-

ated with the new procedures rather than being a product of
changed lawyer attitudes. Those attitudes may in turn have been

affected by the diminished reliance on formal court action to
achieve client goals and to protect client interests.
At the same time, there is no evidence that the advent of
mandated mediation diminished the role of lawyers in divorce
cases in Maine. The proportion of divorce cases involving two
lawyers has declined only slightly since 1980, although there has

been a near-doubling in the proportion of cases with no lawyers
over that time. During the same period in New Hampshire, the
proportion of pro se cases also nearly doubled, and the percentage of cases with two lawyers also declined slightly. The parallel
shifts in the two states suggest that other forces have affected the
likelihood of employing lawyers in divorce cases but that the infor contempt, to reconsider, to modify, for findings of fact, for clarification, for counseling, for payment of child support through Human Services, for conditional default; and
memoranda in support of arguments, requests for production of documents or interrogatories, objections filed, and answers to motions. We recognize that these motions are not
necessarily indicative of formal legal contest in every instance, but they do provide a
rough aggregate measure of formal adversarial actions.
37 Although mandated mediation took effect in lateJuly 1984, it applied to any case
then within the system. Thus, most of the contested cases docketed in 1984 actually were
subject to the mandate.
38 We recognize, of course, that there might be other reasons for the apparent decline in "litigious" motions. For example, along with mandatory mediation, the language
of custody was removed from the statute and replaced with "parental rights and responsibility."
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troduction of mandatory mediation has had no discernible effect
on attorney involvement in divorces in Maine.
Mandatory mediation thus has not "transformed" divorce law
practice in Maine. Nor could it have been expected to given that
law practice and mediation typically require both adversariness
and problem-solving. The engagement of lawyers in divorce mediation appears, however, to have modestly shifted the mix
among these elements both in the daily work of attorneys and in
the mediation process itself.
V. Features of Divorce Mediation Promoting Acceptance
by Lawyers
Divorce mediation programs vary substantially in organization, rationale, and implementation and in the legal policies that
shape their relationship to the formal divorce process. How divorce lawyers respond to divorce mediation depends heavily on
this variation. In our analysis of the integration of mandated mediation in Maine into divorce law practice, we have emphasized a
variety of qualities of that program. The change of any of these
features would, we believe, alter its consequences for law practice. Several characteristics of Maine mediation have contributed
to its incorporation of divorce lawyers in the process: its provision
by the court, its focus on all issues of the divorce, its reliance on
"volunteer mediators," and its mandatory character.
By starting as a court-provided service at no cost to parties, it
was clear that mediation was not developing as a private practice
in apparent competition with lawyers. The provision of mediation in the context of lawyered divorce thus promoted a perception that mediation and legal representation were. not mutually
exclusive.
By including all issues of divorce, 39 not just those some lawyers would gladly delegate to mediation, Maine's mediation program implicitly encouraged the involvement of attorneys
(although some individual mediators did not, especially in the
northern part of the state). While they might not have attended
mediation sessions dealing with visitation times, divorce attorneys
certainly felt compelled to do so if major property issues were
subject to discussion. Nor could mediators easily sustain efforts to
shut lawyers out when the issues at stake included what were perceived to be basic legal issues.
The implicit expectation or encouragement of lawyer participation was reinforced by the lack of any distinctive professional
credentials of what has remained in essence a volunteer corps of
39 McCrory (1987:150-52), who surveyed selected state statutes and court rules on

whether lawyers should participate in mediation, concludes that the answer may depend
on the scope of the issues mediated, with more active participation of attorneys when
mediation addresses property and financial issues.
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nonattorney mediators paid token amounts for their services.
Operating as lay people in a legal arena and lacking a shared
professional identity (such as social work or counseling), these
mediators posed little threat to the role of lawyers in the divorce
process, and in fact were likely to want to draw on the expertise
of divorce attorneys.
Finally, the mandatory character of mediation brought all divorce lawyers into the process, not just the few most receptive to
it. As a result, over the years, it required the adaptation of all
lawyers doing divorce cases and thus served to involve and to ed40
ucate the divorce bar as a whole.

Unfortunately, because lawyers are largely ignored in studies
of divorce mediation, we have virtually no comparative data on
the nature of divorce law practice and its relationship to different
kinds of mediation systems. Much needs to be learned, for example, about divorce lawyers in systems where mediation occurs (or
is mandated) on custody and visitation only. That such comparative analysis might yield interesting results is suggested by data
from the NCSC Database drawn from self-reports of directors of
mediation services across the country. These data show that lawyers participate in mediation in only 38% of the mediation programs that mandate custody mediation but in fully 91% of
mandatory divorce programs that include issues other than custody and visitation. 4 1 Clearly, these characteristics play a part in
shaping lawyers' responses to mediation and defining its role in
their practices. Further research can enhance our understanding
of variations in the ways that lawyers adapt to divorce mediation
in all its forms.
VI. Conclusions
We have argued that the willingness of Maine divorce lawyers
to embrace divorce mediation can best be understood by examining some of the central features of legal practice. At the core of
divorce law practice are scores of decisions that must be made
alongside the technical ones about the law or legal process.
These decisions relate to managing cases and relationships both
with clients and with opposing parties. To simplify, we have clustered these decisions into four dimensions: trial preparation and
40 The context of law practice in Maine may also have influenced participation by
divorce lawyers in mediation. That is, because Maine is a state with no large urban areas,
relationships among lawyers tend to be more personal and thus perhaps more conducive
to cooperation. However, we note that in at least some California and Florida jurisdictions, lawyers reportedly participate regularly in mediation. Thus, the Maine experience
may not be so idiosyncratic (see note 9 for data on California, and Talcott 1989 for description of Florida practice).
41 Mandatory programs counted here in the NCSC Database include those where
cases are sent categorically to mediation or where judges can mandate them on a case-by-.
case basis.
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negotiation for settlement; lawyer and client control over decisionmaking; handling nonlegal and legal issues; and directing
the legal process. Lawyers' decisions in each of these dimensions
of practice may become routinized or patterned as they develop
experience in divorce practice. Because lawyers differ in their
patterns of decisions, they develop reputations-for example, as
reasonable or unreasonable, directive or nondirective, counselors or legal technicians, responsive or procrastinating. Nonetheless, each lawyer must be prepared to make decisions suitable to
the special circumstances of case, client and opponent. "Good
lawyers" are the ones who not only have technical expertise but
who also can make appropriate and variable decisions along
these four dimensions.
In the context of dealing with such choices, lawyers in Maine
perceive mediation as providing new options and resources for
them. Recall that in Maine only about one in five divorces is handled by mediation. But for those cases, lawyers see mediation as
providing an arena that encourages settlement while also aiding
them in preparation for trial. The questions, challenges, and suggestions of fairly active mediators give lawyers valued leverage in
leading clients toward "reasonable" positions without, lawyers believe, compromising their credibility as advocates and supporters.
Atthe same time, they see mediation as permitting their clients a
unique opportunity to voice feelings and to participate directly in
shaping an agreement that suits their needs. Through joint lawyer-client participation in mediation, lawyers believe that they
can take a strong role in drafting agreements on issues with legal
ramifications such as division of pension benefits, while clients
can with lawyer assistance address nonlegal issues such as setting
visitation schedules and dividing personal property. The ability to
invoke mediation within the framework of a mandatory system,
lawyers feel, provides them with new opportunities to control the
pace and direction of a case and to move it forward in the midst
of a busy practice. As these examples suggest, lawyers have come
to believe that they can facilitate the practice of divorce law
through active participation in divorce mediation. Neither their
incomes nor their engagement in the case are diminished. Thus,
we have argued, by participating in mediation, lawyers view themselves as losing little and gaining much.
This interpretation is entirely consistent with the emerging
empirical portrait of compromise-oriented attorneys. In the area
of divorce law practice, in particular, Sarat and Felstiner (1986,
1988) highlight the lawyer's pivotal role in shaping client expectations and leading the way to a negotiated settlement, sometimes against the emotional resistance of an angry client.
Erlanger et al. (1987), Griffiths (1986), and Ingleby (1988) similarly emphasize the lawyer's central role in making often contentious divorce negotiations produce agreements, for example, by
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limiting the flow of information and advice to their clients in order to maneuver them toward settlements. This research depicts
the divorce lawyer as a negotiator who works within and around
the legal process. This view of divorce lawyering makes it appear
far more compatible with the practice of mediation than does
the popular view of litigious lawyering.
The question remains, however, how mediation might
change the settlement work of attorneys. The reports of Maine
lawyers suggest ways in which mediation alters the process for
handling contested divorces in Maine. By providing an official
settlement event, mediation can sharpen the focus on and make
more efficient the process of divorce negotiation. By putting all
the parties and lawyers together in one place at one time, it can
increase party participation in, and knowledge about, the negotiation process. By permitting the airing of feelings and detailed
face-to-face discussion of circumstances, mediation can permit a
contextualization of negotiation that is less likely when it is carried out by lawyers alone. By formalizing and providing a normative frame for negotiation, mediation can constrain some adversarial conduct. Thus, divorce lawyers think that mediation has
changed the nature of the negotiation process both for the parties and for the lawyers.
In sum, divorce mediation in Maine serves as a relatively formal and structured addition to a disjointed negotiation process
that is carried out intermittently by parties or by their lawyers.
Some of its most significant effects occur not through the magical skills of mediators but through the mere fact of an event involving both parties and lawyers. Other pretrial events or administrative checkpoints may perform some of these same functions.
As described by Maine lawyers, divorce mediation is a process
that contrasts markedly with the model assumed by much of the
commentary. Rather than being an alternative to litigation, mediation draws in divorce cases which are among the most heavily
litigated. Rather than demanding that "[1egal rights fade into the
shadow of informality" (Bryan 1992:523), mediation makes legal
rules and rights a key reference point through the participation
of lawyers. Rather than being an informal substitute for trial, mediation serves as a relatively formal adjunct to negotiation (Galanter 1989:xiii). Rather than placing decisionmaking exclusively
in the hands of parties, mediation permits, even strengthens, the
ability of lawyers to influence decisions. And rather than leaving
parties unassisted in the face of pressures of mediators and
stronger parties, mediation interposes lawyers as advisors. Thus,
the observations of Maine lawyers remind us again of the great
variability of the proceedings called "mediation."
This study of divorce mediation and the work of lawyers in
one state leads to some broader observations about the ways that
we think about law and dispute processing. It suggests that too
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much of our theoretical and conceptual work has been
grounded in idealized and polarized conceptions of how dispute
processing and legal practice work. When we learn more about
the day-to-day work of lawyers-which, to a large degree, is the
day-to-day work of the law-these idealized conceptions prove inadequate for guiding empirical, theoretical, or policy debate.
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